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Limits of Constructivism

Koppelman

Forthcoming, Review of Politics
The Limits of Constructivism:
Can Rawls Condemn Female Genital Mutilation?
Andrew Koppelman*

Constructivist political theory, championed most
prominently by John Rawls, builds up a conception of
justice from the minimal requirements of political life.
It has two powerful attractions. It promises a kind of
civic unity in the face of unresolvable differences about
the good life. It also offers a foundation for human
rights that is secure in the face of those same
differences. The very parsimony that is its strength,
however, deprives it of the resources to condemn some
atrocities. Because it focuses on the political aspect of
persons, it has difficulty cognizing violence done to those
aspects of the person that are not political, preeminently
the body. Constructivism thus can be only a part of an
acceptable theory of justice.
Constructivism develops an account of human rights on
the basis of a thin conception of the person and her needs,
abstracting away from controversial conceptions of human
flourishing, and then deduces basic rights from this thin
conception. The hope is that these rights will remain
robust whatever ends the actual people who comprise a
society turn out to have. This strategy works well for
some rights, notably the right to free speech. But people
have urgent needs that go far beyond what is necessary to
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exercise their moral powers or to participate in democratic
dialogue.
I will focus on one extreme human rights case: the
practice of female genital mutilation (FGM), which, I will
bet that you agree, violates basic human rights. Doubtless
Rawls was appalled by the practice. Yet his theory cannot
generate a basis for condemning it. A satisfactory
conception of human rights must draw upon some normative
source beyond that offered by constructivism. This
conclusion is reinforced by considering the work of another
political liberal, Martha Nussbaum, who offers a more
coherent basis for rejecting FGM. Nussbaum accomplishes
this, I will show, only by silently abandoning
constructivism.
How severe a problem is this for constructivism? It
depends on what constructivism is understood to be
attempting. If the aspiration is a justificatory structure
from which a complete account of human rights can be
deduced, then it fails. On the other hand, its attractions
remain powerful if it is understood to articulate a
political ideal, one which however competes with other
ideals and so is of indeterminate strength and scope.
Part I lays out in outline the familiar political
theory of Rawls, focusing on his specification of the basic
liberties. Part II then tests Rawls against the case of
FGM, and shows that his theory cannot generate a basis for
condemning it. Part III considers possible rejoinders by
Rawls. Part IV discusses the implications of the argument.
I.

Rawls’s Constructivism

Samuel Freeman has observed that the “overriding
concern” of all of Rawls’s work “is to describe how, if at
all, a well-ordered society in which all agree on a public
conception of justice is realistically possible.”1 A wellordered society, for Rawls, “is a society all of whose
members accept, and know that the others accept, the same
principles (the same conception) of justice.”2 The aim is a
stable basis for mutually respectful political life in a
society that is profoundly divided about comprehensive
moral doctrines.

1

Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays in Rawlsian
Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4.
2
John Rawls, “A Kantian Conception of Equality,” in Samuel Freeman,
ed., Collected Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999),
255.
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This aspiration is possible, Rawls argues, because
people with different comprehensive conceptions can and
should reach an “overlapping consensus” on the principles
of political cooperation. In an overlapping consensus,
they may disagree about the ultimate foundations of the
political principles that govern them, but they agree upon
the principles, those principles are moral ones, and they
are affirmed on moral grounds.3
Political constructivism begins from a conception of
free and rational persons, which Rawls thinks is implicit
in modern democratic culture. It holds that “the
principles of political justice (content) may be
represented as the outcome of a certain procedure of
construction (structure).”4 The parsimonious conception of
persons and their needs in the original position, and the
decision procedure modeled in A Theory of Justice,
generates the two principles of justice.
The specific conception of justice that Rawls
endorses, based on the idea of the original position, is
designed to exclude from the outset controversial
conceptions of the good. “Systems of ends are not ranked
in value”5 in the original position, because the parties do
not know their conceptions of the good. Those conceptions
of the good simply do not figure into reasoning about the
justice of the basic structure of society.
The exclusion of conceptions of the good shapes
Rawls’s position with respect to both the basic liberties
and the distribution of goods. Each citizen, Rawls thinks,
is entitled as a matter of basic justice to a certain set
of basic liberties, together with a share of primary goods
that is as equal as possible, subject to inequalities that
can be justified by the difference principle.
In response to objections to the specification of the
principles of justice that he offered in A Theory of
Justice, Rawls in Political Liberalism elaborated the
political conception of the person upon which he relied,
and consequently offered a refined specification of both
the basic liberties and the objects of distributive
justice. Persons are regarded as free and equal in virtue
of their possessing to a sufficient degree the two powers

3

See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University
Press, expanded ed. 1996), 144-50.
4
Ibid., 90.
5
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1971; revised edition, 1999), 19/17 rev.
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of moral personality, the capacity for a sense of justice
and the capacity for a conception of the good.6
The two moral powers are derived analytically from the
minimal requirements of human agency and collective selfgovernment. No one can act without a conception of the
good; no collectivity can fairly govern itself without some
sense of justice. The constructivist procedure consists
precisely in building up the conception of justice from
this political conception of the person. Rawls thinks that
any conception of the good that is not analytically
derivable from the constructivist procedure cannot be the
basis of social unity, because of the inevitable plurality
of comprehensive conceptions.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls explained the priority
of liberty with the claim that “liberty can be restricted
only for the sake of liberty itself.”7 Freeman observes
that even if the scope of this demand is restricted to the
basic liberties, it is implausibly strong. Restrictions on
speech that prevent fraud or false advertising infringe on
a basic liberty, but do not rise to the level of a human
rights violation on that account.8
H.L.A. Hart persuaded Rawls that liberty is not the
type of thing that can be maximized, and that A Theory of
Justice did not specify citizens’ most fundamental
interests sufficiently for this to be a workable criterion
of justice.9 The idea of the moral powers provided the
answer that Rawls ultimately endorsed: these liberties
were to guarantee the conditions for the development and
exercise of the moral powers in two “fundamental cases.”
The first fundamental case is connected with the capacity
for a sense of justice; it is “the application of the
principles of justice to the basic structure of society.”10
This is the basis of the political liberties. The second
fundamental case is connected with the capacity for a
conception of the good; it is “the application of the
principles of deliberative reason in guiding our conduct
over a complete life.”11 This is the basis of liberty of
conscience and freedom of association.
Rawls’s final position is that “a liberty is more or
less significant depending on whether it is more or less
6

Political Liberalism, 103-07.
A Theory of Justice, 244/214 rev.
8
Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 64-69.
9
Political Liberalism, 331-34, citing H.L.A. Hart, “Rawls on Liberty
and Its Priority,” in Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls: Critical
Studies of A Theory of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 230-52.
10
Political Liberalism, 332.
11
Ibid.
7
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essentially involved with, or is a more or less necessary
institutional means to protect, the full and informed and
effective exercise of the moral powers in one (or both) of
the two fundamental cases.”12 Freeman observes that
political discussion thus deserves near-absolute protection
because it is central to the exercise of the capacity for
justice.13 The moral powers are protected because they are
indispensable to social cooperation.14
On the other hand, in the case of behavior that does
not concern “constitutional essentials and basic issues of
justice,”15 it is permissible for a legislature to rely on
its comprehensive conception. “Fundamental justice must be
achieved first. After that a democratic electorate may
devote large resources to grand projects in art and science
if it so chooses.”16 Thus political liberalism “does not
rule out as a reason the beauty of nature as such or the
good of wildlife achieved by protecting its habitat.”17 As
Freeman puts it, “it may well be that majority democratic
decision by itself is sufficient ‘public reason’ for
restricting conduct.”18 Thus, for example, the legislature
could act to “protect a dwindling and endangered species of
moles that live in unspoiled prairie land that Old
MacDonald plans to sow in wheat.”19
Rawls similarly refined his account of the primary
goods that are the objects of the difference principle.
The “thin theory of the good” offered in A Theory of
Justice understood the primary goods as “things that every
rational man is presumed to want.”20 This elicited Thomas
Nagel’s objection that there were no primary goods in this
sense: some ways of life – religious asceticism, for
instance - have no use for large amounts of wealth.21 Rawls
revised his conception of primary goods in much the same
way he revised his conception of basic liberties. His
final position was that the primary goods are citizens’
needs understood from a political point of view. According
12

Ibid., 335.
Freeman, Rawls, 70.
14
Ibid., 278, 286, 343, 396.
15
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2001)(hereafter Restatement), 152.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., 152 n. 26; see also Political Liberalism, 214-215.
18
Freeman, Rawls, 80.
19
Ibid; see also ibid., 396-97; T.M. Scanlon, “Rawls on Justification,”
in Samuel Freeman, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 162-63.
20
See A Theory of Justice, 62/54 rev.
21
Thomas Nagel, “Rawls on Justice,” in Daniels, 9-10.
13
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to the political conception, every person has higher-order
interests in developing and exercising his moral powers to
develop a sense of justice and a conception of the good.
Justice requires “conditions securing for those powers
their adequate development and full exercise.”22 The
primary goods are “essential all-purpose means to realize
the higher-order interests connected with citizens’ moral
powers and their determinate conceptions of the good (so
far as the restrictions on information permit the parties
to know this).”23
The moral powers are also the basis for Rawls’s
conception of basic human rights. These are “a special
class of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and
serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and
security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.”24
These are “necessary conditions of any system of social
cooperation. When they are violated, we have command by
force, a slave system, and no cooperation of any kind.”25 As
Freeman puts it, “[h]uman rights are regarded as the
minimal freedoms, powers, and protections that any person
needs for the most basic development and exercise of the
moral powers that enable him or her to engage in social
cooperation in any society.”26 What distinguishes the basic
human rights from the rights provided in justice as
fairness is that the former are so fundamental that, if a
government violates them, its neighbors are justified in
invading its territory to put a stop to the violations.27
II.
A.

The FGM objection
Rawls and sex

To see the limitations of Rawls’s conception of human
rights, begin with his attempts to address the gay rights
issue.
In A Theory of Justice, he argued that justice as
fairness "requires us to show that modes of conduct
interfere with the basic liberties of others or else
violate some obligation or natural duty before they can be
restricted.” In particular, ideas “that certain kinds of
22

Political Liberalism, 74.
Ibid., 76.
24
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge and London:
University Press, 1999), 79.
25
Ibid., 68.
26
Freeman, Rawls, 436.
27
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 78-81, 92-3 n.6.
23

Harvard
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sexual relationships are degrading and shameful, and should
be prohibited on this basis,” are excluded.28 Thus,
prohibitions of homosexual sex would violate the priority
of liberty.
This conclusion, however, was derived from his premise
that liberty can only be restricted for the sake of
liberty. Once that premise is abandoned, a ban on
homosexual relationships appears to stand on the same
footing as the restriction of Old MacDonald’s planting.
Certainly it is not necessary to be able to engage in any
particular sex act in order to participate in political
life.
Is sexual freedom necessary “to secure the full and
informed and effective application of citizens’ powers of
deliberative reason to their forming, revising, and
rationally pursuing a conception of the good over a
complete life”?29 Freeman observes that Rawls’s view of
liberty in his late work is less expansive than John Stuart
Mill’s, since the idea of a central range of application
for the basic liberties does not appear in Mill.30 The
clearest and most forceful case of priority is liberty of
conscience, the freedom to hold and communicate religious,
philosophical, and moral convictions.31 But it is obscure
how this extends beyond freedom of thought, to any
particular action in the world that a person might want to
engage in. The problem lies in the ambiguity of the moral
power to form and pursue a conception of the good. In
order to exercise this power, one must have a menu of
choices. But this does not entail the right to have any
particular option appear on the menu.
Thomas Pogge observes that Rawls’s conception of the
moral powers excludes any interest that is specific to some
citizens and not others. The right to engage in specific
conduct – Pogge uses the example of animal sacrifices – is
“of very little significance to some citizens – and of
great significance to others.”32 It is not clear how these
rights and liberties could be mutually adjusted into a
fully adequate scheme, and the effort “could also be
socially divisive, as any such balancing would produce
winners and losers among conceptions of the good.”33 But
28

A Theory of Justice, 331/291 rev.
Political Liberalism, 335.
30
Freeman, Rawls, 48, 78-79.
31
Ibid., 75-76.
32
Thomas Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 88.
33
Ibid., 89.
29
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severe restrictions on liberty do not preclude the exercise
of the moral powers. “As the case of Immanuel Kant
demonstrates, it is possible (and even easier with modern
communications) to develop and exercise the two moral
powers without ever leaving the vicinity of one’s
hometown.”34 Sodomy prohibitions are another illustration.
They restrict some people’s liberty, obviously, but others
have a strong personal interest in living in the kind of
society in which sodomy is unheard of, and the presence of
openly gay people makes them feel like strangers in their
own neighborhoods, which is not a trivial harm.35 To decide
that sexual freedom is a protected liberty, the moralistic
interests of some citizens would have to be balanced
against the personal interests of others, and
constructivism has no resources with which to perform such
balancing.
Rawls holds that there is “a general presumption
against imposing legal and other restrictions on conduct
without sufficient reason. But this presumption creates no
special priority for any particular liberty.”36 The control
of one’s sexual intimacy is part of nearly everyone’s
conception of the good. But its value cannot be deduced
from the moral powers. It is simply something that most
people happen to value highly, and that is not enough to
qualify something as a primary good:
What are to count as primary goods is not decided by
asking what general means are essential for achieving
the final ends which a comprehensive empirical or
historical survey might show that people usually or
normally have in common. There may be few if any such
ends; and those there are may not serve the purposes
of a conception of justice. The characterization of
primary goods does not rest on such historical or
social facts. While the determination of primary
goods invokes a knowledge of the general circumstances
and requirements of social life, it does so only in
light of a conception of the person given in advance.37
In his last essay, “The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited,” Rawls returned to the gay rights question,
writing that with respect to family law, the requirements
of public reason exclude “appeals to monogamy as such, or
against same-sex marriages,” because such appeals “would
34

Ibid., 87.
See Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol. 4:
Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 39-80.
36
Political Liberalism, 292.
37
Ibid., 308.
35
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reflect religious or comprehensive moral doctrines.”38
Monogamy or opposition to same-sex marriage are however
policy conclusions, not premises. Arguments for these
conclusions might or might not reflect comprehensive
doctrines. Moreover, as we have seen, comprehensive
doctrines are not excluded as a basis for regulating
conduct when this does not infringe on a basic liberty.
How could marriage be shown to be a basic liberty in
Rawls’s terms? Whose moral powers are damaged by its
denial? Rawls concedes, later in the same paragraph,
“there might be other political values in the light of
which such a specification would pass muster: for example,
if monogamy were necessary for the equality of women, or
same-sex marriages destructive to the raising and educating
of children.”39 But of course opponents of same-sex
marriage, even those whose opposition rests on frankly
religious grounds, always do allege exactly this. Patrick
Devlin, to whom Rawls was specifically responding in A
Theory of Justice,40 used purely political arguments to
defend the prohibition of sodomy.
A few sentences later, he puts his foot down:
“arguments for considering, say, homosexual relations
unworthy or degrading” are not appropriate bases for
political action. “Thus, in considering whether to make
homosexual relations between citizens criminal offenses,
the question is not whether those relations are precluded
by a worthy idea of the full human good as characterized by
a sound philosophical and nonreligious view, nor whether
those of religious faith regard it as sin, but primarily
whether legislative statutes forbidding those relations
infringe the civil rights of free and equal democratic
citizens.”41 But how can he be entitled to say that? Once
more, why aren’t gay people in this regard in exactly the
same position as Old Macdonald?
Since sexuality is not necessary to the exercise of
the moral powers, it is not a matter of constitutional
essentials. The legislature could, then, ban same-sex
marriage, or even private consensual homosexual sex, on the
basis of its comprehensive views. Rawls’s theory offers no
basis for regarding gay rights as a matter of basic
justice.42
38

“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in Collected Papers, 587.
Ibid.
40
See A Theory of Justice, 331 n. 54/291 n. 53 rev.
41
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 588.
42
His weakness in this regard is also noted by Carlos Ball, The
Morality of Gay Rights (New York: Routledge, 2003), 22-30.
39
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This gap will trouble some readers less than others.
Gay rights remain controversial. I therefore move on to an
omission that will alarm nearly everyone. Rawls’s Kantian
constructivism cannot cognize the injustice of the ritual
practice, common in some northern parts of Africa, of
female genital mutilation (FGM).43
B.

Rawls and FGM

FGM is commonly practiced on girls, sometimes as young
as infancy. It almost always involves removal of the
clitoris, and sometimes involves much more radical damage
to the pubic area. When medical complications are
avoided,44 the consequence of FGM is often (not always) that
women experience a greatly diminished capacity for sexual
pleasure.45 FGM has been outlawed all over the world,46 and
it is widely agreed that prohibiting the practice is a
matter of basic justice for women. But this condemnation
is obviously not universal. If it were, the practice would
disappear. As an international statement condemning FGM
43

I use this example with acknowledgement of the danger, emphasized by
Yael Tamir and acknowledged by her critics, that Westerners will regard
this unfamiliar practice with “smug, unjustified self-satisfaction,”
ignoring the abuses of women’s bodies – the powerful cultural pressures
that lead to breast implants, tummy tucks, botox injections, and
anorexia - that are commonplace in our culture. Yael Tamir, “Hands Off
Clitoridectomy,” Boston Review, Summer 1996; see also responses in
Boston Review, Oct./Nov. 1996; Clare Chambers, “Are Breast Implants
Better than Female Genital Mutilation? Autonomy, Gender Equality and
Nussbaum’s Political Liberalism,” Crit. Rev. of Int’l Soc. & Pol. Phil
7 (Autumn 2004): 1-33.
44
FGM is frequently performed in unsanitary conditions and may result
in severe, occasionally life-threatening medical complications. As
Western technology spreads, the procedure is increasingly performed by
medically trained personnel with anesthesia, sterile tools, and
antibiotics. See Ellen Gruenbaum, The Female Circumcision Controversy:
An Anthropological Perspective (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 54-59, 144-49. Medical professionals
perform nearly half the operations in Somalia. Carla Makhlouf
Obermeyer, “Female Genital Surgeries: The Known, the Unknown, and the
Unknowable,” Med. Anthrop. Q. 13(1)(1999): 100 n.21. Some practices,
such as infibulations, are especially likely to damage the subject’s
health, see Gruenbaum, 5-7, but the near-universal condemnation is not
confined to those practices. Medical complications are a concern but
are not at the core of the objection to FGM. I am aware of no critic
of FGM who claims that it would be acceptable if performed according to
normal surgical protocols.
45
There is considerable variation in the effect on women’s sexual
experience. Gruenbaum, 133-157.
46
See Anika Rahman & Nahid Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide
to Laws and Policies Worldwide (London and New York: Zed Books, 2000).
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observed in 1996, “Human behaviours and cultural values,
however senseless or destructive they may appear from the
personal and cultural standpoint of others, have meaning
and fulfil a function for those who practise them.”47
FGM is not devoid of purpose. When researchers ask
African women why they support the practice, they find that
the women do get something out of it.48 One survey found
that 82 percent of Egyptian women support a continuation of
the practice.49 Some think, in accordance with long-settled
cultural norms, that FGM initiates them into womanhood and
their tribe. Some regard the clitoris as unhygienic and
ugly. Some regard FGM as necessary to become a real woman.
Some regard the practice as divinely sanctioned; some think
that it is a requirement of Islam. It is often a valued
marker of ethnic identity. Particularly in its more severe
forms, it makes sexual intercourse difficult and so
increases the likelihood that a woman is a virgin before
marriage. It is also thought to enhance a husband’s sexual
pleasure. For these reasons, it is sometimes indispensable
to a woman’s marriageability, in societies in which
marriage is vital to a woman’s status and security.50 At
least some of these are genuine goods, and the rest are
strongly felt to be so. In order to reject FGM, one must
argue that they are outweighed by the harm caused by the
loss of sexual capacity. But that involves just the kind
of balancing that, Pogge showed, Rawls was unwilling to do.
People from many different cultures agree that
prohibiting the practice is a matter of basic justice for
women. Yet, can Rawls say this?
47

Joint statement by the World Health Organization, UN Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), and UN Population Fund, February 1996, quoted in Gruenbaum,
198.
48
See generally Gruenbaum; Sander L. Gilman, “’Barbaric’ Rituals?,” in
Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds., Is
Multiculturalism Bad For Women? (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1999), 53-58. This is ignored in the summary condemnation of
FGM by Susan Okin, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women,” in ibid., 1415, and “Reply,” in ibid., 124-25. She treats FGM as if it were
obvious that its only purpose is to help men control women.
49
Obermeyer, 87.
50
See Gruenbaum; Nahid Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A Call for
Global Action (Women Ink, 1995), 35-37. This last factor suggests that
many who participate in the practice might prefer to live in a world in
which there were not pressure to conform to the custom, but dare not
risk their daughters’ economic futures by refusing to participate. See
Gerry Mackie, “Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention
Account,” Am. Sociological Rev. 61 (1996):999-1017. But this does not
mean that they are not consenting to the practice, given the
circumstances in which they find themselves.
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Consider an immigrant mother who wants to have the
operation performed (by a competent surgeon) on her
daughter. Is there a basis in political liberalism, as
formulated by Rawls, for saying that the state has an
obligation to interfere with her? Does not the mother
satisfy Rawls’s very abstract standards of reasonableness?
Rawls assumes that the family is an association “in which
elders (normally parents) have a certain moral and social
authority.”51 The immigrant mother does not propose to tell
anyone else how to raise their children. The principle
that each parent gets to make value choices on behalf of
their own children is a time-honored constraint on state
power in free societies, one on the basis of which people
could reason in common. Her comprehensive view, which
entails FGM, is not an unreasonable one, and “reasonable
persons will think it unreasonable to use political power,
should they possess it, to repress comprehensive views that
are not unreasonable, though different from their own.”52
It will not do to say simply that political liberalism
aims to “secure[e] the conditions under which we can
further our determinate conception of the good, whatever it
is.”53 FGM does not deprive its victims of their capacity
to exercise their moral powers. It does not deprive them
of primary goods. It removes an option, of course, but it
provides other options. The value of the lost option is
irrelevant for Rawls’s theory, because “in establishing the
fair terms of social cooperation (in the case of the basic
structure) the only relevant feature of persons is their
possessing the moral powers (to the sufficient minimum
degree) and having the normal capacities to be a
cooperating member of society over a complete life.”54
Sexuality, then, is not a feature of persons that is
relevant from the standpoint of basic justice.55 Rawls’s
constructivist procedure asks, “which traditionally
51

“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 596. Rawls may be more
deferential to this authority than his philosophy ought to imply. See
Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities
Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 270-83. But
even with much less deference, the state would need some reason to
invade parental prerogatives, and constructivism cannot supply this.
52
Political Liberalism, 60.
53
Ibid., 106.
54
Ibid., 79. Doubtless Rawls himself would have thought it highly
relevant, but his constructivism does not capture this concern.
55
This is also noted in Ball, 22. Martha Nussbaum observes that Rawls
implicitly “make[s] personhood reside in (moral and prudential)
rationality, not in the needs that human beings share with other
animals.” Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability,
Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 159.
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recognized principles of freedom and equality, or which
natural variations thereof, would free and equal moral
persons themselves agree upon, if they were fairly
represented solely as such persons and thought of
themselves as citizens living a complete life in an ongoing
society?”56 In order for the harm of FGM to be recognized,
persons have to be represented, not solely as free and
equal moral persons, but as sexual beings who have the
vulnerabilities specific to such beings. FGM does not
deprive its victims of their moral powers or their normal
capacities for cooperation. FGM hurts them in other ways.
Rawls would clearly deem it permissible for a
government to ban FGM at the legislative stage. He demands
government neutrality toward conceptions of the good only
with respect to the basic structure. But the prohibition
of FGM is a matter of legislative discretion. It would not
be required by justice. The legislature’s discretion,
moreover, is remarkably broad. It could rely on its
comprehensive views about well-being to enact a law
requiring that girls undergo FGM, in the same spirit in
which states now require that children be vaccinated
against disease.
III.

Rawlsian rejoinders
Has Rawls really no resources with which to condemn

FGM?
Earlier drafts of this essay have been shown to a
number of distinguished scholars of Rawls, and they have
been unanimous in rejecting the claim just made. This,
they argue, is an easy case for him. They have not,
however, agreed about why.
There are at least five Rawlsian rejoinders: (1)
Rawls condemns FGM as a kind of child abuse; (2) FGM
permanently deprives girls of a valuable option, thereby
restricting their equality of opportunity and capacity for
moral choice; (3) FGM violates women’s basic right to
health; (4) FGM violates the integrity of the person; (5)
FGM is an instance of gender inequality. I will take them
up in turn.
(1) Child abuse. Rawls observes that “parents must
follow some conception of justice (or fairness) with regard
for their children,” although “within certain limits, this
is not for political principles to prescribe.” But those
56
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limits exist: justice entails “the prohibition of abuse
and neglect of children.”57 Is FGM a kind of child abuse?
This argument depends on clarifying what counts as
abuse, a problem that Rawls does not explore. Within the
terms of political constructivism, abuse would appear to
consist in treating a child in such a way that the child
fails to develop its moral powers, or is thwarted in
exercising those powers as an adult.
[W]e try to answer the question of children’s
education entirely within the political conception.
The state’s concern with their education lies in their
role as future citizens, and so in such essential
things as their acquiring the capacity to understand
the public culture and to participate in its
institutions, in their being economically independent
and self-supporting members of society over a complete
life, and in their developing the political virtues,
all this from within a political point of view.58
Persistent beatings are likely to thwart the course of
moral development contemplated in Chapter 8 of A Theory of
Justice. Eamonn Callan has shown that Rawls’s theory
involves quite demanding educational requirements. Good
liberal citizens must be able to distinguish disagreements
which are the product of the burdens of judgment from those
which merely reflect prejudice or error.59 In order to do
this, they must develop a certain measure of ethical
autonomy.60
In order for this argument to condemn FGM, it would
have to be shown that FGM does damage the pertinent moral
powers. Women who have had FGM performed upon them are,
however, fully capable of being good liberal citizens.
Some of the smartest and most articulate critics of FGM are
women upon whom the operation has been performed.
The root of the problem is Rawls’s narrow conception
of the pertinent moral powers, in which the capacity for
pleasure has no place.61 Part of the explanation is
probably that Rawls’s work is from the beginning a reaction
against utilitarianism, which makes pleasure central to
moral reasoning. For Rawls, pleasure is either too
private, allowing some people to claim an unfair share of
57
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resources, or too intersubjective, failing to take
seriously the distinction between persons.62 Might he share
with practitioners of FGM a certain uneasiness with
pleasure’s potentially destabilizing power?
(2) Restricted moral capacity. FGM infringes on
women’s exercise of their moral powers by depriving them of
a valuable option. Thus Martha Nussbaum: “Female genital
mutilation means the irreversible loss of the capability
for a type of sexual functioning that many women value
highly, usually at an age when they are far too young to
know what value it has or does not have in their own
life.”63 This makes sense from within the terms of
Nussbaum’s philosophy, at least when the operation is
performed on children.64 She is no constructivist; her list
of basic capabilities that should be guaranteed to everyone
includes many elements that could not be deduced from
Rawls’s two moral powers.65 But it is not clear how
anything like this can be said from within the terms of
Rawlsian constructivism, which forbids a substantive
judgment of the comparative goodness of different options.
Eamonn Callan’s Rawlsian condemnation of FGM raises a
similar difficulty:
If the integrity of one’s body is a precondition of
personal sovereignty in sexual matters, the genital
mutilation of female children in some cultures is a
gross violation of their prospective interest in
sovereignty. The practice is indefensible because it
cannot be squared with the moral equality of the
child’s prospective interest and the adult’s realized
interest in a zone of personal sovereignty.66
Rawls, however, has no basis for singling out
“personal sovereignty in sexual matters” as particularly
62

Bonnie Honig suggested to me that Rawls, in his determination to move
beyond utilitarianism, may have failed to appreciate the importance of
pleasure to human moral life.
63
Martha Nussbaum, “Judging Other Cultures: The Case of Genital
Mutilation,” in Sex and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 124.
64
It is less clear that Nussbaum can condemn the operation when
performed upon adults. See Chambers.
65
The list of capabilities appears in many of Nussbaum’s writings. One
recent version is Frontiers of Justice, 76-78. Its elements include
the ability to live a life of normal duration, the ability to have good
health, the ability to move about freely, freedom from violence,
reproductive choice, the ability to imagine, think and reason, the
ability to laugh and play, political and property rights on an equal
basis with others, and many other things.
66
Callan, 147. Callan does not discuss male circumcision or earpiercing.

15

Limits of Constructivism

Koppelman

important. The outlawing of FGM for girls does not
preserve all options. It closes off one option while
opening up others. Once more, it is not clear how the
basic moral power to have and pursue a conception of the
good entails the right to do anything in particular.
Equality of opportunity only matters if the opportunity
being foreclosed is indeed a valuable one.
Another formulation of this rejoinder would begin by
noting that all citizens are entitled to revise their
conceptions of the good (in ways that are compatible with
the right). This puts limits on the ways a parent can
treat his children -- a father cannot so restrict the
choices of his daughter that she cannot make up her own
mind about the kind of life to live. FGM in childhood
often makes it impossible for a daughter, once she reaches
adulthood, to enjoy her sexuality.67
This rejoinder would only have force if the child’s
capacity to revise her conception of the good were being
impaired for no reason at all. Then there would be a loss
of opportunity to exercise the moral powers with nothing at
all to compensate for it. However, as we have seen, this
is not true of FGM.
(3) The right to health. It may also be claimed that
FGM damages a girl’s health. This cannot refer to the
danger of infection from the procedure – as noted above,
that can be controlled by performing it competently under
sterile conditions – but the impairment of sexual
functioning. A healthy person has capacities that are
harmed by FGM.
“Health,” however, is a contested concept. Sickness
is deviancy from a norm. The norm is not given by nature.
The “blight” that strikes corn is labeled a disease because
humans want the corn crop to survive; otherwise we would
just talk about the competition between two species.68
Health is simply a desirable state of affairs. I agree
that FGM is damaging to a girl’s health, but only because I
think that the capacity to orgasm is desirable – a
conclusion that can’t be derived from Rawlsian
constructivism. Rawls writes that the right to medical
care “falls under the general means necessary to underwrite
fair equality of opportunity and our capacity to take
advantage of our basic rights and liberties, and thus to be
normal and cooperating members of society over a complete
67
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life.”69 This is the source of the “urgency” of “treatment
that restores persons to good health, enabling them to
resume their normal lives as cooperating members of
society.”70 But FGM does not impair women’s ability to be
cooperating members of society. Condemning FGM on the
basis of “health” is a cheat, because it assimilates a
controversial conception of well-being to an
uncontroversial one, and then relies on the uncontroversial
one to do the normative work.
(4) The integrity of the person. We already noted
Callan’s claim that FGM violates “the integrity of one’s
body.”71 Rawls lists “integrity of the person” among the
basic liberties.72 But there must be limits to this. It
must be permissible to perform necessary surgery on
children, for example. Does unnecessary surgery count as a
violation of the integrity of the person? What counts as
“unnecessary” is of course deeply contested. Few people
are upset by cosmetic surgery for children to eliminate
medically harmless, but socially stigmatizing, deformities.
(It seems strange to us that North Africans regard the
clitoris as a deformity, but reduction surgery is routinely
performed in the United States on female infants with
unusually large clitorises.) Many Americans pierce the
ears of their daughters (but not their sons) to accommodate
earrings; this goes almost completely unremarked. Male
circumcision has not produced anything like the
condemnation that FGM has provoked, because its ritual
significance is more widely appreciated and its effect on
sexual pleasure is much more uncertain. Do these practices
violate fundamental human rights? If a well-ordered
society has a neighbor where the piercing of young girls’
ears is customarily practiced and tolerated by the state,
would military intervention be warranted?
When Rawls cites the integrity of the person, he most
obviously has in mind violations of bodily integrity, such
as assault or torture, that impair the exercise of the
moral powers. As we have already seen, FGM does not do
this. Since it does not, the Rawlsian right of integrity
cannot extend this far.
(5) Gender inequality. Rawls might also condemn FGM
as a variety of gender inequality. The practice is only
done to women, it harms women, and it exists for the sake
of satisfying male concerns about female chastity and male
69
70
71
72

Restatement, 174.
Ibid.
Callan, 147.
Political Liberalism, 291.

17

Limits of Constructivism

Koppelman

pleasure. But, again, this only works if what’s lost is
valuable. Ear-piercing and male circumcision are also sexspecific marks of inequality that reinforce traditions of
female subordination. If one is looking for sex-specific
practices that violate Rawlsian justice, FGM is less
objectionable than the Western practice of enlarging
women’s breasts with silicone implants – a procedure that
is usually performed on consenting adults, but in response
to social pressures that are often experienced as crushing.
The harms caused by implants include chronic pain and an
increased likelihood of early death, since the implants
make it harder to detect incipient breast cancer.73 These
obviously compromise any exercise of the moral powers.
Once more, as with children, it is only interference
with the moral powers that raises fundamental issues of
justice. “The equal rights of women and the basic rights
of their children as future citizens are inalienable and
protect them wherever they are. Gender distinctions
limiting those rights and liberties are excluded.”74 The
italics are mine, and the italicized language is
restrictive. Since FGM does not impair women’s rights and
liberties as citizens, it does not violate basic justice.
It may also be said that FGM is unjust because it is
only done to women, and thus rests on a view that the
deprivation of sexual pleasure is trivial if it happens to
women, but not to men. Such a view obviously treats women
less respectfully than men. This response however
implicitly relies on the assumption, which we have seen is
unavailable to the Rawlsian constructivist, that sexual
pleasure is something that matters a lot. Once more, other
gender-asymmetrical burdens, such as the denial to Jewish
males of the sensations of sex with a foreskin, are less
troubling.75
IV.

The knife in the clam

How big a problem is constructivism’s inability to
address FGM? It depends on how important it is to exclude
nonconstructivist ideas of the good from our conception of
justice. Rawls fears that such nonconstructivist ideas
cannot be the basis of social unity. In this, we can now
conclude, he is too pessimistic. There is an impressive
amount of agreement about FGM, even though constructivism
lacks the resources to condemn it.
73
74
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The source of the pessimism, for Rawls, is the
experience of inevitable pluralism. “Our individual and
associative points of view, intellectual affinities, and
affective attachments, are too diverse, especially in a
free society, to enable those doctrines to serve as the
basis of lasting and reasoned political agreement.”76 For
this reason, justice cannot depend on any comprehensive
conception.
There is a revealing slippage in Rawls’s understanding
of what a comprehensive conception is. A conception is
comprehensive, Rawls explains, “when it includes
conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals
of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and
of familial and associational relationships, and much else
that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life
as a whole.”77 “A conception is fully comprehensive if it
covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather
precisely articulated system.”78 There cannot be social
consensus around such fully comprehensive conceptions.79
However, Rawls also relies on a much more peculiar
notion, that of a “partially comprehensive” conception,
which comprises “a number of, but by no means all,
nonpolitical values and virtues and is rather loosely
articulated.”80 This is an odd locution. It is like saying
that a person with a speck of dirt on his shoulder is
partially buried. Evidently “comprehensive” refers to any
conception of the good not derivable from constructivism,
even if it is itself not very comprehensive at all.81
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Are “partially comprehensive” conceptions impossible
bases of social unity? Consider one possibility: a
political liberalism that guarantees to everyone the
opportunity to exercise the moral powers, but also
opportunities for sexual satisfaction, at least via
heterosexual intercourse within marriage. In other words,
Rawls’s constructivism with one tiny bit added. Call it
C+S (constructivism plus sex). The addition of that tiny
bit makes C+S into a partially comprehensive conception.
Why would one think that this diminishes the prospects for
social unity? It rather seems to increase the likelihood
of social unity, at least compared with constructivism,
since so many people are persuaded that FGM violates basic
justice.
The real problem is that the bit that has been added
is not derived from the moral powers, in the way the other
goods on the list were. It lacks constructivist
credentials. Once the bouncer has let this patron in, the
lack of such credentials can no longer be a principled
reason to exclude others. If there is such a reason, it
can’t be derived from constructivism. The addition of FGM
is not like a small additional wing on the constructivist
building. To vary the metaphor, it is more like a knife in
a clam. Once the blade gets in, the clam has no resources
left for keeping anything else out.
Rawls evidently thinks that pure constructivism is the
only reliable path to social unity. In modern societies,
there is so much normative pluralism that the only
overlapping consensus that is consistent with respectful
relations is that constructed without any reference to the
actual normative views of members of society. That is why
“partially comprehensive” views must be excluded.
Political liberalism, he argues, should be freestanding, so
that it “can be presented without saying, or knowing, or
hazarding a conjecture about, what [comprehensive]
doctrines it may belong to, or be supported by.”82 “[T]he
political conception of justice is worked out first as a
freestanding view that can be justified pro tanto without
looking to, or trying to fit, or even knowing what are, the
existing comprehensive doctrines.”83 This approach may
Nussbaum, “Rawls and Feminism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls,
500-03 (collecting pertinent passages in Rawls’s work).
82
Political Liberalism, 12-13.
83
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Reason Revisited,” 585; Restatement, 37, 188-89. T.M. Scanlon explains
why the strategy of surveying actual comprehensive views would not be
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possibly work under certain circumstances, but they are
likely to be as unusual as the circumstances in which it is
safe to drive a car while blindfolded.
Rawls aspires to “civic friendship,” in which we the
citizens exercise power over one another on the basis of
“reasons we might reasonably expect that they, as free and
equal citizens, might reasonably also accept.”84 In order
for people to be “reasonable where others are concerned,”
Rawls writes, they must be “willing to govern their conduct
by a principle from which they and others can reason in
common.”85 Citing and paraphrasing the more fully
elaborated view of Thomas Scanlon, Rawls writes that in
order to be reasonable, we should want “to be able to
justify our actions to others on grounds they could not
reasonably reject – reasonably, that is, given the desire
to find principles that others similarly motivated could
not reasonably reject.”86 Comprehensive doctrines can
reasonably be rejected. “Since there are many reasonable
doctrines, the idea of the reasonable does not require us,
or others, to believe any specific reasonable doctrine,
though we may do so.”87
This formulation carries with it some of the
difficulties of Scanlon’s own view. Unity with others may
be attractive, but we give up on that as soon as we decide
that what matters is what they would accept were they
reasonable, rather than what they actually accept.
Scanlon’s criterion of ideal justifiability, Colin McGinn
observes, “effectively surrenders the idea that morality
necessarily involves unity with others – actual unity, I

comprehensive views and inadequate, in an argument for stability, to
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mean. For what is the point of unity with purely
hypothetical others?”88
Rawls’s aspiration is similarly hypothetical. “[O]ur
exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials
of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals
acceptable to their common human reason.”89
This hypothetical aspiration is still present even in
Rawls’s last, somewhat chastised conception of the
possibility of social unity. Rawls eventually acknowledged
that there is “a family of reasonable though differing
liberal political conceptions.”90 Even if Rawls’s basic
framework is accepted, “there are indefinitely many
considerations that may be appealed to in the original
position and each alternative conception of justice is
favored by some considerations and disfavored by others.”91
Freeman observes that the concession that there will not be
general agreement on justice as fairness “must have been an
enormous disappointment to him, for he had worked for
nearly forty years trying to show how a well-ordered
society where everyone accepts justice as fairness as its
public charter is a realistic possibility . . . .”92
The family of reasonable conceptions still evidently
includes only those that can arguably satisfy Scanlonian
standards. For any of these conceptions, “when terms are
proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation,
those proposing them must think it at least reasonable for
others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not
as dominated or manipulated or under pressure caused by an
inferior political or social position.”93 As Freeman puts
it, “[e]ven if reasonable and rational democratic citizens
cannot agree on the same conception of liberal justice –
not to mention the most reasonable conception for Rawls,
justice as fairness – all are under a duty to propose and
88
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support laws that they can reasonably expect other citizens
can reasonably endorse in their capacity as free and equal
citizens.”94 The aspiration to hypothetical agreement
remains a regulatory norm even after it is admitted that
the aspiration for actual agreement is forlorn.
The reasonableness here is not the reasonableness of
prediction, the way we ask whether it’s reasonable to think
that you can get that jalopy to start on this frigid
morning. It is not a claim about what it is probable that
the citizens of a society will endorse. Rather, it is a
claim about what it is reasonable to ask them to endorse.
The payoff may then be, not social unity, but confidence in
our own righteousness as we gird for political warfare. If
the demands of constructivism are reasonable, but our
fellow citizens do not in fact endorse them, then that is
their fault and not constructivism’s. We may not be able
to have unity with them, but we can have unity with
hypothetical reasonable others.
A more charitable reading would understand Rawls and
Scanlon as making proposals, proffering terms of
cooperation that are a possible basis for community among
persons with differing views. “Putting people’s
comprehensive doctrines behind the veil of ignorance
enables us to find a political conception of justice that
can be the focus of an overlapping consensus and thereby
serve as a public basis of justification in a society
marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism.”95 The path to
actual civic friendship leads through reasonable terms of
cooperation.96
If what you want is unity with actual others, however,
you had better learn what those others think before you
start proposing terms of cooperation with them. Rawls’s
answer, abstracting away from all comprehensive views, is
problematic from his own perspective if the regime it
produces so alienates some citizens that they no longer
feel themselves part of the political community. The
consequences of excluding “partially comprehensive” views
may be unacceptable to some. If, as I have argued,
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constructivism cannot cognize atrocities such as FGM, they
may even be unacceptable to you.
Of course, if a thicker conception of the good than
that imagined by constructivism is integral to the basic
structure of the regime, that will alienate some people,
too. The immigrant mother considered earlier, for example.
You’re going to have political alienation whatever you do.97
It can’t be eliminated. But it can be minimized. One can
try to have as small a remainder of alienated people as one
can manage. And even with respect to them, the regime will
be a good deal less brutal if it understands that
remainders are inevitable.98 The task of achieving that is
a prudential one, involving practical consequential
judgments. The problems it raises are not resolvable from
the standpoint of high theory. Constructivism is one
possible solution, perhaps suitable for a society that
faces a maximum of moral disagreement. But that does not
appear to be our situation.
The question with which Rawls begins is still the
right question to ask: "how is it possible for there to
exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal
citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?"99 Rawls’s
response is political liberalism. Constructivism of the
kind he contemplates is part of any possible answer; a
system that denies some people the opportunity to exercise
their moral powers in the fundamental cases is not a system
of cooperation at all.100 (I regard the present article as
a friendly amendment to Rawls.) But must political
liberalism stop there? The answer depends on what counts
as political liberalism. Perhaps Rawls’s understanding of
the demands of political liberalism is too stringent, so
that conceptions that may in fact be attractive bases for
social unity, such as C+S, are unnecessarily excluded.
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In order for a conception of justice to be political,
Rawls writes, three conditions must be satisfied: it must
apply solely to the basic structure of society, be
independent of any wider comprehensive doctrine, and be
elaborated in terms of ideas implicit in a society’s public
political culture.101 Given his broad definition of what
counts as a wider comprehensive doctrine, this seems to
permit only some variety of constructivism. Anything else,
such as C+S, violates the second condition.
If one wants an overlapping consensus without
constructivism, then it will not do simply to remove
Rawls’s second condition. That lets in far too much. So
the criteria for political liberalism must be revised
altogether.
The kind of wholesale revision that I am suggesting
has already been undertaken, unannounced, in the recent
work of Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum claims that she is a
“political liberal,” and says that in this she is following
Rawls.102 However, she justifies this label for her own,
capabilities-based conception of justice on very different
grounds than Rawls relies upon: (1) it is openended and
subject to revision; (2) its terms are specified in an
abstract way; (3) it is “freestanding” in that it is not
grounded in any particular moral conception; (4) it
emphasizes capability and not functioning, so that people
can choose whether to exercise any particular capability;
(5) the major liberties that protect pluralism, such as
freedom of speech, are central on the list; (6) it is not a
basis for intervention in the affairs of other states,
absent crimes against humanity.103
Nussbaum silently abandons Rawls’s constructivist
sense of “freestanding,” by which he means that a
conception “can be presented without saying, or knowing, or
hazarding a conjecture about, what [comprehensive]
doctrines it may belong to, or be supported by.”104 For
Nussbaum, “freestanding” means that a conception “does not
contain any particular metaphysical or epistemological
doctrine, and can be rendered compatible with the major
ones that citizens may hold.”105 It is obviously a good
101
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deal easier to satisfy Nussbaum’s requirement than Rawls’s.
Many partly comprehensive views could meet Nussbaum’s
criteria; none could meet Rawls’s.106
It is unsurprising, then, that Linda Barclay disputes
Nussbaum’s claim to be a political liberal. Barclay has
argued that the controversial goods on Nussbaum’s
capabilities list show that Nussbaum is not a political
liberal at all, but rather has formulated a distinctive
kind of comprehensive liberalism, “a theory that takes as
its most central value the realisation of each individual’s
capacity to choose and pursue their own conception of the
good life.”107 Nussbaum responds by acknowledging the
controversial elements of her conception, but (here
silently reducing the six characteristics above to the
single most important one) she insists that her conception
is still “acceptable to people holding many different views
of life.”108 This criterion is responsive to the needs of a
pluralistic society, but it is also less formal and, more
importantly, less demanding than that laid down by Rawls.
If Nussbaum is a political liberal, it is because she has
redefined political liberalism in a way that makes the club
of political liberals easier to get into. This move is
objectionable if and only if pure constructivism, of the
kind that Rawls offers, is the best way to respond to the
fact of pluralism.
There is a certain ipse dixit quality to Nussbaum’s
capabilities list: none of the elements are argued for;
she simply hopes that the reader will agree that these are
necessary elements of a decent human life.109 She is, at
106
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the same time, cautious about saying too much. Thus she is
not even willing to say that the exercise of the
capabilities is good, since that does not show enough
respect for those who disagree.110 This effort to be just
barely specific enough is a delicate one. It is not clear
how one can valorize a capability without valorizing what
the capability is for.111 But if the execution of her
project generates puzzles, the project itself is the right
one to undertake: to minimize the remainder, while taking
a stand on those matters with respect to which she is
unwilling to budge.
*
I noted at the outset that constructivism has two
attractions: it provides a secure foundation for human
rights, and it makes possible a kind of civic unity in the
face of intractable differences about what is good. It
should now be clear that both of these selling points need
to be qualified. Constructivism provides a foundation for
some rights, but others equally urgent will require support
from some other source. The civic unity constructivism
offers may not be the most inclusive unity available in our
society.
What can we say about the intractability of
disagreement about the human good? Sometimes goods can be
bad. Different people have different ideas about what
makes a life good, and these differences may make it hard
to live together in a mutually respectful way. Introducing
controversial conceptions of the good into politics can
have pernicious consequences. It is necessary somehow to
contain goodness. Rawls’s constructivism attempts to
filter out bad goods. But, as we have seen, it filters out
too much; it is unable to cognize some goods that are
intensely relevant to questions of justice.
It is sometimes appropriate to define some good, for
political purposes, at a high level of abstraction, so that
it incorporates unorthodox as well as conventional
variants. The state will then be neutral among those
variants, and so filter out conceptions of the good that
these entitlements is a life so reduced that it is not compatible with
human dignity.” Frontiers of Justice, 278-79.
110
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are inappropriately specific. But whether this is so in
any particular case will depend on the reasons for
abstraction that obtain in that particular case.112
The opening of discourse on justice to partly
comprehensive views is not a prescription for civil peace.
It means that there will be endless contestation and
negotiation about the kind and degree of neutrality we will
have. Rawls concludes his final book with the sober
reflection that if his political ideal of reasonableness
cannot be realized, “[i]f . . .human beings are largely
amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one
might ask, with Kant, whether it is worthwhile for human
beings to live on the earth.”113 But these are not the only
possibilities. It is possible that the specific terms of
reasonable cooperation proposed by Rawls are not feasible,
but that human beings nonetheless continue to strive for
respectful cooperation, albeit on different terms than
Rawls proposes. That striving, in a context of continuing
disagreement about justice, is not the constructivist
vision of social unity. But it may be “the deepest and
most reasonable basis of social unity available to us as
citizens of a modern democratic society.”114
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